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Abstract 
This article examines the structure and spatial patterns of violent political organizations in the 
Sahel-Sahara, a region characterized by growing political instability over the last 20 years. 
Drawing on a public collection of disaggregated data, the article uses network science to 
represent alliances and conflicts of 179 organizations that were involved in violent events 
between 1997 and 2014. To this end, we combine two spectral embedding techniques that have 
previously been considered separately: one for directed graphs (relationships are asymmetric), 
and one for signed graphs (relationships are positive or negative). Our result show that groups 
that are net attackers are indistinguishable at the level of their individual behavior, but clearly 
separate into pro- and anti-political violence based on the groups to which they are close. The 
second part of the article maps a series of 389 events related to nine Trans-Saharan Islamist 
groups between 2004 and 2014. Spatial analysis suggests that cross-border movement has 
intensified following the establishment of military bases by AQIM in Mali but reveals no 
evidence of a border ‘sanctuary’. Owing to the transnational nature of conflict, the article shows 
that national management strategies and foreign military interventions have profoundly affected 
the movement of Islamist groups. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Inter-state conflicts usually start with a declaration of war and end with surrender, negotiation or 
an armistice between the belligerents. By contrast, many modern conflicts are seemingly 
intractable. This trend is particularly evident in the Sahel-Sahara region in North and West 
Africa, a battleground for Islamists seeking to impose sharia, rebels seeking independence, 
transnational traffickers, and former colonial powers looking to project influence. While many 
Sahel-Saharan countries oscillate between periods of rebellion and political unrest, and periods 
of peace and reconciliation, the actual location and onset of violence defy prediction. Long 
considered a poster-child of political stability, Mali, for example, faced a military coup, a 
rebellion, a Western military intervention, and several major terrorist attacks – all in less than 2 
years. By contrast, Chad, plagued by civil war and rebellion until the end of the 2000s, has been 
experiencing an unexpected period of stability – it is among the very few destinations in the 
Sahara that is still considered safe for tourists (OECD 2014). 
 
Against this background, this article examines the relationships between alliances and conflicts 
as a putative explanation for the apparent unpredictability of many modern wars in the Sahel-
Sahara. Social scientists have long been preoccupied with the logic of violence, explaining the 
presence and absence of violent conflict, and the onset and diffusion of internecine violence. 
Ostensibly, these are important questions to answer if we hope to prevent and forestall violent 
conflict. However, in the Sahara-Sahel these models seem to have little explanatory traction: 
although they vary, the preconditions for violent conflict are omnipresent, yet violence itself 
seemingly eludes prediction while actual patterns of violence are volatile. Recent research on the 
social determinants of conflicts in political geography has shown that political allegiances in the 
Sahel-Sahara were fluid and largely not ideologically motivated (Hagen 2014). Armed groups 
split and coalesce unpredictably, change names as new opportunities arise, and morph as 
ephemeral coalitions between tribal and ethnic groups. A similar volatility characterizes 
commanders and rank-and-file fighters who frequently shift allegiances among regular forces, 
rebel movements, and violent political organizations (VPOs), depending on local circumstances 
(Author, 2013). 
 
The initial objective of this article posits a relational approach to the study of the structure of 
relationships among state and non-state actors. In doing so, it harnesses network theory for which 
social phenomena such as political violence are necessarily mediated by social interactions (Burt 
1992). Drawing on a public collection of data on political violence, the article uses network 
science to represent alliances and conflicts between 179 organizations involved in violent events 
between 1997 and 2014. Owing to the fundamentally relational nature of internecine violence, 
we are particularly interested in the way the structural positions of conflicting parties affect their 
ability to resort to political violence. To this end, we combine two spectral embedding techniques 
that have previously been considered separately: one for directed graphs that takes into account 
the direction of relationships between belligerents, and one for signed graphs that takes into 
consideration whether relationships are positive or negative between groups.  
 
Our second objective is to analyze the spatial patterns of violence across the region by localizing 
violent events and studying the geographic scales of regional dynamics. The literature presumes 
that borders matter because they circumscribe sovereign territories that impose transaction costs 
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on those who cross. But do borders matter to Islamist groups in the Sahel-Sahara region? If so, 
what are their effects? And what transaction costs, countervailing or otherwise, do they impose 
on the movement of Islamist groups? In a geographical environment where populations remain 
poor and sparse, recent research on the spatiality of conflict in the region has established that 
cross-border mobility was an important component of military strategy (Zenn, 2014). Armed 
groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) capitalize on marital, political, and 
financial ties throughout the region to attack targets, take hostages, and evade security forces 
(Guidère 2011, Wilkinson, 2012, Lebovich 2013, Bøås 2014). These general principles of desert 
insurgency based on mobility, speed and range challenge the Clausewitzian conception of 
warfare: hold territory and attack the enemy’s strongest point (Keegan 1993). While the desert is 
seen by many as a hostile environment that “distances and isolates [VPOs] from major 
population centers and force them to disperse rather than concentrate their forces” (USAID 2014: 
16), it can also provide a resource to strike anywhere, anytime, and without apparent logic. 
Focusing on 389 violent events in which nine Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups have been involved, we 
highlight specific spatial patterns that emerge from a longitudinal analysis of events over a ten-
year period starting in 2004. Due to the transnational nature of conflict, we ascertain the 
countervailing transaction costs that borders represent, notably by testing whether national 
borders limit the displacement of Islamist groups or serve as sanctuaries whence attacks are 
launched. 
 
The article proceeds as follows. The second section reviews the literature on the social and 
spatial organization of state and non-state organizations in West Africa, paying particular 
attention to the role of networks and national borders. The third section presents the data and 
explains how, using network analysis and geographical information systems, we structured them 
into networks and chronological events. The fourth section models the structural position of 
actors in conflict. The fifth section addresses the spatial patterns of Islamist groups and 
implications of the findings for theory, method, and practice. 
 
2. Previous research 
 
2.1 Conflicts and signed networks 
 
Greater access to geo-referenced data and the use of spatial statistical analysis has advanced the 
study of social and spatial patterns of armed groups over the past decade. While past analyses of 
(civil) wars were limited by a lack of reliable data, the proliferation of satellite and disaggregated 
data has spawned innovative approaches to investigating the onset and diffusion of political 
violence across time and space (Zammit-Mangion et al. 2013, von Uexkull 2014, Dowd 2015, 
De Juan 2015). The concomitant proliferation of political and economic predictors on which the 
spatial-analytical approach in geography can draw now includes factors as diverse as the nature 
of government, ethnic divisions, poverty, income, inequality, number and morale of troops, 
frequency of droughts, and endowment of natural resources (O’Loughlin and Raleigh 2008 for a 
review). Some factors that may explain why groups resort to violence are also related to the 
structure of relationships that connect actors in conflict (Radil and Flint 2013, Philipps 2015). 
Political violence is a relational process; so, individuals and organizations are all, to varying 
degrees, embedded in networks of alliances and conflicts that enable or restrain action. 
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The increasing availability of disaggregated data, combined with recent conceptual and 
computational advances in network science, is reason to reevaluate the importance of social 
network analysis (SNA) within the field of conflict studies. SNA is the study of individual 
actors, groups, organizations or countries, represented by the nodes of the network, and the 
relationships between these actors, represented by their links. As both a paradigm of social 
interactions based on graph theory and a method, SNA seeks to understand networks by mapping 
out the ties between the various nodes as they are rather than how they ought to be or are 
expected to be (Newman 2010). 
 
SNA is particularly adept at capturing the complexity of conflict situations due to its ability to 
describe, represent, and model signed networks, i.e. networks that contain both positive and 
negative relations. Positive ties develop to overcome collective-action problems, enforce trust 
and ideology, coordinate activities at a distance, distribute resources, or disseminate ideas and 
decisions. Political alliances between states are typical of positive-tie networks. By contrast, 
negative ties develop among actors that dislike, avoid, or fight one another with various levels of 
intensity. For positive and negative ties, SNA can be used to study the structure and function of 
the network as a whole, and the role of each node in the group in relation to others. Maoz and 
colleagues, for example, have used a network approach to model the effect of political and 
economic interdependence on the evolution of inter-state conflicts over a century (Maoz 2006, 
Maoz et al. 2006). Using the case of World War I, Flint et al. (2009) and Radil et al. (2013) have 
shown how alliances or rivalries between states could explain the diffusion of war on a global 
scale. Radil and Flint (2013) have applied the same approach at the African level. 
 
Recent studies have noted that networks with positive ties tend to be structured differently from 
those with negative ties (Everett and Borgatti 2014). Networks based on friendship, alliance and 
collaboration are known for being denser and more clustered around actors that share similar 
values than networks containing negative ties, because individuals and organizations tend to 
have more friends than enemies (Huitsig et al. 2012). Positive-tie networks also convey more 
resources, ideas, and knowledge than negative-tie networks based on hatred, avoidance or 
conflict. As a result, many centrality measures based on the assumption that social networks 
serve as conduits for flows of information, advice, or influence, such as betweenness or 
closeness centrality, are unrealistic in the case of actors in conflict (Everett and Borgatti 2014). 
For example, if the Algerian military is the common enemy of both AQIM and the Movement 
for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), flows are unlikely to pass from AQIM to 
MUJAO through the Algerian military. Networks containing negative ties are also well known 
for having a low level of transitivity, a principle that assumes that two actors that share a 
connection to a third actor, are likely to be connected themselves. 
 
A growing literature in conflict studies and related social sciences suggests that, despite their 
differences, positive- and negative-tie networks should be analyzed simultaneously (Labianca 
and Brass 2006, Grosser et al. 2010, Rambaran et al. 2015, Yap and Harrigan 2015). One way to 
incorporate both allies and adversaries is to use structural balance theory, which argues that 
social relations are stable if they contain an even number of negative ties (Newman 2010). Stable 
groups of three actors (known as triads), for example, are theoretically stable if everyone likes 
everyone else, or if two actors are in conflict with a third party (Doreian and Krackhardt 2001, 
Hummon and Doreian 2003, Doreian and Mrvar 2015). Over time, unstable triads theoretically 
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evolve towards stable triads, because instability creates tensions that can only be resolved by 
altering views, behaviors and alliances. Another approach to signed networks is to model the 
structural autonomy and constraints of actors. In a recent article, Smith et al. (2014) argue that an 
actor’s political independence is constrained both by its potential to reach other actors’ resources 
and by the structural position of allies and enemies. Being connected to a single ally that is free 
of threat considerably reduces the autonomy of actors in signed networks, while a diversified 
network of allies enhances autonomy. 
 
This article adopts a complementary approach. Instead of assuming that political violence is 
explained by attributes of the belligerents or by exogenous factors, we posit network structure to 
enable or constrain political violence. To do so, the first part of our analysis aims at representing 
how VPOs are connected to their allies and enemies. Using several centrality measures, we 
identify subclusters of actors within which conflict or cooperation is particularly developed, and 
highlight the main structural differences between positive- and negative-tie networks. Since 
enemies and allies are inextricably linked in real-life networks, the second analytical part of the 
article considers positive and negative ties simultaneously. Using spectral embedding techniques 
that place the nodes representing organizations at the position that best balances the “pull” of 
allies against the “push” of enemies, we model the balance between the relative effects of having 
allies and foes simultaneously. We take into account the fundamental asymmetric nature of 
conflicts and consider whether groups attack more or less than they are attacked. Combining 
signed and directed networks, we expect groups with similar allies and foes and similar 
aggression patterns to form clusters that concur with their structural position in the social 
network. 
 
2.2 Conflicts, borders and safe havens 
 
A growing literature suggests that national borders are not only potential sources of dispute 
between states; they also provide a safe haven for VPOs that compete with sovereign states (for a 
recent review, see Medina and Hepner 2013). Borders open markets of opportunity for rebels and 
jihadists that exploit weak states (Korteweg and Ehrhardt 2006, Innes 2007, Campana and Ducol 
2011) and their lack of intraregional cooperation. Of the 59 terrorist groups designated by the 
U.S. Department of State in January 2014, 39 are thought to operate from a safe haven 
(Arsenault and Bacon, 2015), many of them in border areas. In Asia, border sanctuaries are 
mainly found in Pakistan- and Indian-administered Kashmir, Pakistan’s Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas, Pakistan’s North Waziristan, and Baluchistan. In the Middle East, the Syrian and 
Iraqi borders are well-known safe havens to myriad armed groups (Philipps and Kamen 2014). 
Sunni-dominated areas of the Syrian-Lebanon border are used as safe havens by Syrian 
opposition forces, whereas Shia-dominated areas are used by Hezbollah to launch attacks or 
enter Syria (U.S. Department of State, 2014). In South America, the Colombia-Venezuela border 
and the Brazil-Paraguay-Argentina triangle have been linked to transnational groups (Brafman 
Kittner, 2007). In Africa, the Great Lakes region and the Liberia-Sierra Leone borderlands have 
been used by rebel groups to challenge the sovereignty of states, while Somalia is well-known as 
a sanctuary for Al-Shabaab (Meservey 2013, CSIS 2014). 
 
How VPOs use borders in the Sahel-Sahara is a matter of scholarly debate. Some claim that 
terrorist groups such as AQIM have divided Africa into “zones”, each led by an emir (Tawil 
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2010, Global Terror Watch 2013) and that the movements of the most prominent emirs are 
primarily centered on certain regions (GCTAT, 2013). This approach explicitly deems sovereign 
state borders safe havens for traffickers, rebels and terrorists. Others contend that the territorial 
notion of safe haven was probably an inappropriate concept to grasp the spatiality of Trans-
Saharan politically violent organizations (Author 2014, 2015). While certain VPOs have 
repeatedly mounted attacks in the same area, this approach argues that attacks mostly seek to 
control strategic cities and lines of communication, and not to capture and hold territory. This 
principle explains why the aims of many Salafist groups are more socio-political than territorial: 
“All we want is the implementation of Sharia” reportedly said a member of the Ansar Dine group 
in Mali, “We are against independence” (The Punch 2012). This is reminiscent of pre-colonial 
polities that distinguished between ownership and control of land and where, as noted by Herbst 
(2002: 40), authority extended everywhere people had pledged obedience to the king. Daesh has 
adopted a similar strategy. It seeks to control a network of cities, roads, military bases and oil 
resources across Syria and Iraq and promotes the view that all true believers should be brought 
under a Caliphate, without necessarily holding a contiguous and fixed territorial entity (Arango 
and Barnardmay 2015). 
 
This article engages this controversy in light of the spatiality of VPOs and the effect of sovereign 
state borders on their movements. Do borders represent sanctuaries behind which VPOs wage 
turf battles over aspirational homelands? Or, as T.E. Lawrence (1920) posited a century ago, is 
desert warfare more like naval war in the sense that insurgents are mobile and relatively 
indifferent to the constraints imposed by their environment? We propose that the degree to which 
groups can move and challenge the territorial integrity of sovereign states is a function of the 
porosity of borders. From the beginning of the millennium until the French-led Opération Serval 
regained control of the main cities of Mali in 2013, intraregional cooperation remained weak and 
each state had its own border-management strategy (Lacher 2012). This uncoordinated response 
to the rise of VPOs in West Africa should have an observable effect on their mobility patterns 
across the region. More cross-border movement might be anticipated where borders are not 
heavily guarded and/or easy to cross due to informal arrangements with state authorities than 
where there is greater capacity to ensure border integrity through effective border patrols and law 
enforcement. 
 
3. Research design 
 
3.1. Social network analysis 
 
Our analysis relies on disaggregated data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset 
(ACLED), which provides a comprehensive list of political events by country between 1997 and 
2014 (ACLED 2015, Raleigh et al. 2010, Raleigh and Dowd 2015). The fifth version of the data 
was used to select 37 VPOs in the Sahel-Sahara region, their allies and their enemies, excluding 
non-identified Islamist and Libyan militias (see Appendix 1). The scope was limited to events 
with the following seven referents: Battle – no change of territory; Battle – Non-state actor 
overtakes territory; Battle – Government regains territory; Riots and protests; Violence against 
civilians; and Remote violence. This produced a list of 3231 events involving 179 organizations 
and 27,791 fatalities. 
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The ACLED dataset describes (up to) four groups in each incident: an attacker (A), a 
collaborator in the attack (B), a target (C), and a potentially assisting group that may also be a 
secondary target (D). This data is used to build a social network in which the nodes are groups, 
with positively weighted directed ties between groups that interacted (B to A, and D to C) and 
negatively weighted directed ties between attacker and target (B to C). For example, on January 
12, 2014, clashes between French troops (A) and Malian troops (B) on the one hand, and Ansar 
Dine (C) and MUJAO (D) on the other hand, claimed 11 lives, including Islamist leader Abdel 
Krim, and 60 injured (ACLED incident 486MLI). Incidents are aggregated so that the ties 
between any pair of groups reflect all of their interactions. There can be both positive and 
negative ties, and in both directions, between the same two groups. Directions are important 
because they are surrogates for intentionality: a group on the offensive makes a conscious 
decision to attack while the defender has no choice, and other groups must decide whether to join 
in or not. These decisions reflect a calculus of advantage or ideological alignment. 
 
The resulting graph is analyzed in two steps. First, we map the networks containing negative and 
positive ties separately and analyze the most prominent actors using several centrality measures. 
Because negative-tie networks do not serve as conduits for flows of information, advice, or 
influence, we use degree centrality, which simply refers to the standardized number of ties each 
node has, and eigenvector centrality, which refers to the number of nodes adjacent to a given 
node, weighted by centrality, and indicate whether nodes are connected to other well-connected 
nodes. For our positive-tie network, we use eigenvector centrality and betweenness centrality, 
which measures the number of shortest paths from all nodes to all others that pass through that 
node (Freeman 1979). 
 
Second, we combine both positive and negative ties into a single network, and embed this 
network in a geometric space in such a way that the distance between each pair of points 
accurately reflects the balance between the ‘pull’ from collaborating groups and the ‘push’ from 
aggression between them. These distances are globally integrated by considering not only 
immediate neighbors
1
, but neighbors of neighbors and, in fact, the structure of the entire graph. It 
is this integration that makes the process challenging: positive relationships are naturally 
transitive (“the ally of my ally could plausibly become my ally”) but negative relationships are 
not (the proverbial “enemy of my enemy is my friend” does not obtain). Technically, the 
adjacency matrices that describe positive and negative ties are combined into a matrix, called a 
Laplacian, that combines both kinds of ties and normalizes the representation so that well-
connected nodes are central and poorly connected nodes peripheral (see representation Zheng 
and Skillicorn 2015, Zheng et al. 2015 for more details). This Laplacian matrix is transformed to 
discover the directions in which the graph varies the most and these are used as axes for creating 
an embedded graph. In this representation, position and distance are meaningful. Sets of ‘bad 
actors’ such as VPOs and (supposedly) ‘good actors’ such as governmental forces and civil 
society tend to form polar opposites in some dimension(s) of the representation. Since proximity 
represents similarity – commonly known as an alliance – distance tends to represent opposition. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 In the networks considered, “neighbors” refer to actors who cooperate or fight each other, and do not necessarily 
refer to locational space. 
8 
3.2. Spatial patterns 
 
To understand the spatial strategies of VPOs, we limit the scope to nine Trans-Saharan 
organizations that subscribe to an Islamist ideology: Al Qaeda, Ansar Dine, AQIM, the Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA), Al Mourabitoune, the Free Salafist Group (GSL), the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (GSPC), MUJAO, and Those Who Signed in Blood. Affiliated with al 
Qaeda, these Islamist groups share a common historical and ideological background and form 
several components of a single, flexible network, rather than independent entities. As reminded 
by Hagen (2014: 2), “AQIM overlaps with a number of nominally independent and ‘locally-
focused’ groups, such as Ansar al Dine and MUJAO. These groups are part of the larger AQ 
family and cannot be separated from AQ and AQIM”. Mergers, name changes and splits are 
common. For example, GSPC – a splinter group of GIA of Algeria – rebranded itself as AQIM 
in 2007. Some of its members broke off in 2011 to form MUJAO while others formed Al 
Moulathamoun (2012) and Al Mouakaoune Biddam (2012) (Wojtanik 2015). In 2013, MUJAO 
merged with Al Moulathamoun to form Al Mourabitoune, which, in 2015, was renamed Al 
Qaeda in West Africa (Joscelyn 2015). Those groups frequently exchange information, funding, 
hostages, and conduct joint operations since several of their leaders have historically been 
members of AQIM’s leadership network (Hagen 2014) and have developed multiple allegiances 
across organizations (United Nations 2015). Our sample does not include Boko Haram; its 
activities are almost exclusively located in the Sahelian part of West Africa and its use of 
political violence differs from other Islamist organizations in the region (Menner 2014, Zenn 
2015). While AQIM has urged local emirs to refrain from violence against civilians and 
encouraged them to gain the hearts of the people, Boko Haram has, since its leader was killed in 
2009, used indiscriminate violence as its principal political instrument (Forest 2012, Zenn 2012). 
 
Using a Geographical Information System (GIS), our first step is to map all violent events in 
which these Islamist groups were involved over the last 10 years. The year 2004 is the starting 
point of the development of VPOs that had hitherto been almost exclusively located in Algeria 
(Dowd and Raleigh 2013). These groups, their allies and their enemies are responsible for 389 
violent events totaling 1,434 fatalities through 2014. Our next step is to develop two hypothetical 
scenarios to distinguish distinct spatial patterns. The ‘mobility’ scenario assumes violence 
follows a linear chain of events: groups move from one location to the next, possibly across 
borders, without returning to their original location. This would reflect the strategy of a group 
under intense pressure from security forces, or, alternatively, of a group that has mastered 
movement in an arid environment. By contrast, the ‘sanctuary’ scenario supposes a territorial turf 
whence groups operate across borders and a clear origin of flows. Once the location of each 
event is known, our third step is to connect violent events chronologically through hypothetical 
lines and verify if the general spatial pattern of the attacks corresponds to one of the two 
scenarios described above: the ‘mobility’ scenario where groups move freely across borders, or 
the ‘sanctuary’ scenario where groups use a particular region as a rear base. Since the ACLED 
database does not contains information about the movements of Islamist groups, we use dotted 
lines to indicate that spatial patterns based on the location of violent events do not necessarily 
correspond to actual physical movement between places, but rather to a longitudinal series of 
events. 
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4. A social network analysis of political violence 
 
4.1. Negative- and positive-tie networks 
 
We start with a graph that represents each organization as a node that is connected to those actors 
with which it is in conflict. The size of the nodes in Figure 1 is proportional to the number of ties 
(or degree). 
 
Figure 1: Negative ties between organizations involved in violent events, 1997-2014 
 
Note: Isolates are not shown. 
 
Three main clusters emerge: the Nigerian cluster that is polarized by Boko Haram; the Trans-
Saharan cluster that is composed of groups affiliated with Al Qaeda such as GSPC and AQIM 
and their enemies; and the Libyan cluster that is composed of myriad Islamist brigades and pro-
government forces. With a density of only 0.023, the network is very sparse, which is typical of 
networks that are made up exclusively of negative ties: the number of enemies a group can have 
is often more limited than the number of potential allies (Huitsig et al. 2012). The network also 
has a low level of transitivity: in only 1.2% of the triads enemies of enemies are in fact enemies, 
while in most cases (98.8%), enemies of enemies are friends. Finally, organizations with adverse 
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attributes tend to be in conflict with one other, a tendency known as heterophily (Csaba and Pál 
2010, van Mastrigt and Carrington 2014). This can be tested using the E/I index, which 
calculates the difference between external and internal ties for each group of actors (government, 
rebels, militias, civilians, Islamists, and external forces), divided by the total number of ties. The 
E/I index for the network is positive (0.899) and statistically significant (chances of getting the 
result right by guessing are less than 1%), which confirms that VPOs clash with organizations 
that do not belong to the same category. 
 
At the level of the organization, the network is composed of few highly central organizations 
(Table 1). That makes sense since being in conflict with many adversaries simultaneously is 
widely regarded as a liability rather than as an asset (Labianca and Brass 2006). Negative 
relationships adversely affect the outcomes of VPOs’ military operations, reduce their ability to 
coordinate activities across the region, and limit their ability to cooperate to achieve their 
political or religious goals. Among politically violent organizations, AQIM has the highest score 
in degree and eigenvector centrality, which indicates that it has the greatest number of enemies 
and is connected to other actors that also have many enemies, such as the military and police 
forces of Algeria. MUJAO, GSPC and GIA also occupy a prominent structural position due to 
their conflicts with civilians, and armed forces in several countries. Other prominent actors 
include Boko Haram, which stands out for being connected to many other actors who themselves 
have few connections to one other, and some Libyan groups such as Ansar al-Sharia and Libya 
Shield Brigade. 
 
Table 1: Top-scoring nodes for selected centrality measures – negative ties 
Rank Degree centrality Eigenvector centrality 
1 AQIM (0.264) AQIM (0.743) 
2 Boko Haram (0.200) MUJAO (0.421) 
3 MUJAO (0.136) Military Forces of Algeria (0.289) 
4 Ansar al-Sharia (0.120) GSPC (0.257) 
5 Ansar Dine (0.096) Ansar Dine (0.229) 
Mean 0.024 0.071 
Std. Dev. 0.035 0.095 
Note: Scores are indicated between brackets. 
 
The structure of the network of enemies contrasts strongly with the one showing how 
organizations involved in violent events have collaborated across the region. As depicted in 
Figure 2, the positive-tie network is divided into three main unconnected groups of allies, one 
triad connecting an unidentified armed group to Boko Haram and Ansaru, and three dyads. 
 
The main cluster on the left is structured around North and West African military and police 
forces and their civilian allies, which are represented in red and yellow respectively. This cluster 
is indirectly connected to some of the main Islamist groups in the region, which are represented 
in green, through the secessionist movement MNLA. MNLA was allied with Ansar Dine in the 
first weeks of the Malian conflict before switching sides and fighting alongside the French-led 
military forces in 2013. The two other clusters are related to the Libyan conflict. One is 
structured around the armed forces of Libya and their pro-government brigades and battalions, 
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the other around Islamist groups and ethnic and communal militias. Each cluster has a chain-like 
structure in which organizations are rather distant from one another. The Algerian Private 
Security Forces, for example, are eight steps away from Al Mourabitoune. The long path-length 
distance, low density (0.034) and low clustering coefficient (0.104) of the network are typical of 
a structure that is not organized around groups of tightly connected actors. This suggests that 
most governmental forces and VPOs tend to build bilateral or trilateral alliances rather than 
broad coalitions across the region. The graph also highlights the lack of regional cooperation 
between government forces that face similar threats: there is no reported tie between the military 
forces of Libya and Algeria, or between the military forces of Cameroon and Nigeria. 
 
Figure 2: Positive ties between organizations involved in violent events, 1997-2014 
 
Notes: green nodes refer to Islamist groups, red to government forces, yellow to civilians, and 
blue to other actors. 
 
Military and police forces have the highest eigenvector and betweenness centrality, followed by 
Ansar al-Sharia and the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries (BSCR), both of which hail 
from Libya (Table 2). Generally speaking, betweenness centrality scores – that refer to the 
propensity to bridge clusters – are very low, even for top-scoring nodes, which suggests that the 
networks contain few exceptional brokers. Only the French military forces play a role in bridging 
several African armed forces that would otherwise not be connected, hence their high 
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betweenness centrality. Once again, the isolation of Boko Haram in Nigeria contrasts sharply 
with the network of alliances among other Sahelo-Saharan and Libyan groups.  
 
Table 2: Top-scoring nodes for selected centrality measures – positive ties 
Rank Eigenvector centrality Betweenness centrality 
1 Military Forces of Nigeria (0.400) Military Forces of France (0.111) 
2 Police Forces of Nigeria (0.379) Military Forces of Algeria (0.071) 
3 Ansar al-Sharia (0.223) Military Forces of Mali (0.070) 
4 Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries (0.260) Military Forces of Nigeria (0.062) 
5 Military Forces of Libya (0.193) MNLA (0.052) 
Mean 0.039 0.012 
St. Dev. 0.082 0.022 
Note: Scores are indicated between brackets. 
 
 4.2. Spectral embedding 
 
Now, we compute the spectral embedding of the social networks derived from the ACLED data. 
Initially, for the sake of simplicity, we disregard the direction of the ties. The embeddings are 
shown in Figure 3. Negative ties resulting from recorded attacks are shown in red and positive 
ties resulting from alliances, or at least common purpose, are shown in green. The general 
structure is of a group of opposing poles representing groups whose primary relationship is that 
they attack or are attacked by groups at the other pole. The graph clearly shows how ‘bad’ actors 
such as Islamist and Jihadist groups are grouped opposite ‘good’ actors, both violent and non-
violent. The contrast is particularly evident for Boko Haram, and its opposition to governmental 
forces and civilians from Nigeria and Cameroon, as well as for GIA-GSPC-AQIM, and its 
opposition to Algerian armed forces and civilians. The graph also shows that the attack patterns 
of GIA, GSPC and AQMI differ significantly from those of Ansar Dine, MUJAO and Al 
Mourabitoune, which are located much closer to the center of Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Spectral embedding showing positive and negative ties 
 
 
 
Any measure that considers a group in isolation is unable to distinguish VPOs from military or 
police organizations because both have similar patterns of interaction. We, therefore, compute 
measures of outward and inward aggression based not on the number of such incidents but on the 
length of the relevant ties in the embeddings. A group’s position in the embedding reflects its 
relationships with all of the groups with which it interacts, and, therefore, the length of the 
embedded ties is more revealing than simply the number of attacks. For example, the distance of 
a group from the center of the embedding reflects not only how many other groups attack it (or 
are attacked by it) but also the extent to which its enemies are similar to one another (close in the 
embedding). Thus a long red tie measures not only the existence and frequency of attacks, but 
also their strategic intensity. On Figure 4, groups are plotted at the same positions as in the 
spectral embedding presented in Figure 3 to denote “levels of aggression”. They measure the 
outgoing aggression of each group and the incoming aggression to which it is subjected. They 
are color-coded: red means a group generates more aggression than it receives; orange means 
that the group generates some outgoing aggression; and green means that there is no outgoing 
aggression (individual scores are presented in Appendix 1). 
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Figure 4: Spectral embedding showing levels of aggression 
 
 
 
The vicinity of groups presented in Figure 4 allows us to distinguish VPOs (almost all groups are 
red) from national defense forces (many are also red but adjoined by orange or green). In other 
words, most of the polar opposites consist of ‘bad actors’ on one side and ‘good actors’ on the 
other, and they are structurally distinct. ‘Bad’ aggressive actors such as AQIM or Boko Haram 
tend to be in clusters of net aggressors, or isolated; ‘good’ aggressive actors such as militaries 
tend to be in clusters with orange and green groups. Neutral actors such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) tend to fall in the middle and green. Victims are also green 
but tend to be located near their champions. 
 
Northern Nigeria and Libya are particularly interesting as they involve many VPOs with strong 
structural constraints. From the literature we would expect Northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram 
is particularly dominant, to have more of a dual structure than Libya, where myriad of violent 
groups compete for the control of the state and oil resources (Gow et al. 2013). We find that our 
intuition was correct as Figures 5 and 6 show. Spectral embedding showing conflicts and 
cooperation for 37 organizations in Northern Nigeria clearly confirms that Boko Haram is in 
conflict with virtually everyone, a situation comparable to that of ISIS in the Middle East, which 
opposes all governments and non-state actors – including Al Qaeda – in the region.  
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Figure 5: Spectral embedding showing positive Figure 6: Spectral embedding showing 
and negative ties for 37 organization in  positive and negative ties for 30 
Northern Nigeria     organizations in Libya 
 
        
 
Note: for the sake of clarity, Ansaru is not shown. 
 
In Libya, spectral embedding conducted on 30 organizations highlights the ongoing conflict 
between pro-Islamist groups and pro-government forces (Figure 6). Islamist groups, on the left 
of the graph, are composed of Islamist militias such as Libya Dawn and Libya Shield, and of 
Jihadist groups close to Al Qaeda such as the Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), a coalition 
that includes Ansar al-Sharia, the 17 February Brigade, and the Rafallah Sehati Brigade. These 
groups, based in Tripoli and in Benghazi, all oppose the Libyan army, as indicated by several 
long red ties. Among pro-government forces, on the right, are anti-Islamist militias such as the 
Zintan Militia, the Al-Sawaiq Battalion and the Al Qaqa Brigade. Civilians and journalists are 
located near the internationally recognized authorities of Libya. 
 
5. Spatial analysis of mobility patterns 
 
This section examines the spatiality of select Islamist groups that have developed attack patterns 
across the Sahel-Sahara region. For strategic and policy purposes, we are particularly interested 
in whether state border strategies and multinational military missions have had a measurable 
effect on the transborder movement of Islamist groups. 
 
5.1. Changing mobility patterns 
 
The analysis that follows reveals no evidence of a ‘sanctuary’ pattern in which Islamist groups 
make systematic use of a particular border area. However, Table 3 reveals that the movement of 
Islamist groups changed completely between 2004 and 2014: while the first seven years were 
marked by an apparent unpredictability of events across time and space, the last three years were 
characterized by a concentration of events, due to the outbreak of the Malian conflict and the 
strategies adopted by some states to control their borders. This shift occurred in a political 
environment where the number of violent incidents and victims related to Islamist groups in Sub-
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Saharan Africa has been on the rise (Dowd 2013, 2015, Dowd and Raleigh 2013). While only 30 
events totaling 201 victims were reported between 2004 and 2008, there were 359 events and 
1233 victims between 2009 and 2014. The intensification of attacks significantly reduced the 
average frequency between violent incidents, from an average of 44.8 days in 2008 to 7.5 days in 
2014. 
 
Table 3: Key metrics 
Year Number 
of events 
Cross-border 
movements 
(%) 
Number 
of victims 
Average 
distance 
between 
events (km) 
Average 
distance to 
borders (km) 
Average time 
between events 
(days) 
2004 15 43 103 478 132 27.3 
2005 3 50 63 502 39 122.7 
2006 3 50 15 675 334 209.0 
2007 1 - 3 - 162 35.0 
2008 8 43 17 411 63 44.8 
2009 11 80 30 136 137 36.5 
2010 17 63 75 708 199 18.4 
2011 29 61 64 864 106 12.8 
2012 103 7 153 234 148 3.5 
2013 155 13 768 330 146 2.6 
2014 44 19 143 463 154 7.5 
 
The region has always been characterized by a high level of transborder activity. Figure 7 
confirms that, until 2011, Islamist groups travelled extensively across borders and, in many 
regions of Mali, Mauritania, Algeria and Niger, without much risk of being apprehended. After 
Algeria expelled them, they were tolerated by the Malian government of President Amadou 
Toumani Touré (2002-2012), which sought to capitalize on divisions within Tuareg society and 
on a withdrawal of the state to administer the northern part of the country. Successive events 
repeatedly occurred hundreds or thousands of kilometers apart, in different countries, and 
irregularly, from Algeria to Mauritania, the Mauritanian-Malian border, and Niger. In 2005 and 
2006, the average distance between two events exceeded 500 km, which is impressive given the 
harsh terrain and lack of road infrastructure, in particular in the Sahara.  
 
One of the best known movements of this period is also the one that marked the beginning of the 
Saharan expansion of what would become AQIM. Between 21 February and 11 April 2003, 32 
European tourists were kidnapped in the region between Illizi and Amguid in Algeria by 
Abderazak el-Para (born Amar Saïfi) and Abdelhamid Abu Zeid (born Mohamed Ghadir), two 
militants of GSPC. As Algerian security forces gave chase, the terrorists and hostages initially 
journeyed of over 3000 km to northern Mali. After having spent several months establishing 
alliances with leaders of local nomadic tribes, they moved to Niger through the plains of 
Azawagh, Aïr Mountains and the Ténéré desert, and ended up in the mountainous area of Tibesti 
in Chad where they were killed or captured, a second journey of over 2500 km through some of 
the most inhospitable environment on the planet (Author 2010). 
 
In 2011, Mauritania and Algeria undertook a series of joint counter-terrorism operations aimed at 
AQIM’s military bases. Such an attack took place in the Wagadu forest on the border between 
17 
Mauritania and Mali in June. The central intelligence cell created to facilitate co-ordination 
between Saharan and Sahelian countries, known as the Combined Operational General Staff 
Committee (CEMOC), first met in Bamako in April 2011. Nonetheless, the level of regional 
cooperation remained low because Mali was not trusted by its neighbors, which accused it of 
colluding with Islamist groups. Henceforth, Mauritania and Algeria would conduct military 
operations in Mali when they deemed their interests to be threatened by the activities of 
transnational groups. The chronological succession of attacks by AQIM in 2011 shows a high 
intensity and percentage of cross-border movements. For example, AQIM claimed responsibility 
for a bomb attack in Bamako, the capital of Mali, on 5 January, followed by a hostage taking in 
Niamey, Niger three days later. On February 1, these attacks were followed by an AQIM car 
bomb in the Mauritanian town of Adel Bagrou, the abduction of an Italian tourist in Djanet, 
Algeria, a day later, and the killing of a Mauritanian policeman by two members of AQIM in the 
region of Legsseiba near the north bank of the River Senegal on February 3. 
 
The year 2012 contrasts sharply with the period 2004-2011 because most events transpired in 
Mali, and, to a lesser extent, Algeria. Following the fall of Col. Muammar Gaddafi in Libya 
(2011) and President Amadou Toumani Touré (2012) a provisional alliance between Al Qaeda-
affiliated groups and secessionists rebels of the MNLA launched a wide-ranging military 
offensive against the Malian army. Over a matter of weeks, all major cities of Northern Mali 
were seized, including Tessalit and Kidal in the Adrar des Ifoghas, where the offensive started, 
as well as Menaka, Timbuktu and Gao. New groups such as MUJOA and Ansar Dine were 
particularly active during this period and started to clash with their former Tuareg allies over the 
cities of the north of the country and main lines of communication. Our analysis shows that 
during this period the distance between violent events and borders is the more stable 
(approximately 150 km) than the preceding period during which average distances to borders 
varied from 39 to 334 km.  
 
In 2013, the French-led Opération Serval reasserted control over Northern Mali. As French and 
Chadian troops progressed north, Islamist groups were driven from Kona, Douentza, Gao, 
Timbuktu, and were chased out of their stronghold of the Adrar of the Ifoghas. Operation 
Panthère, launched around Tessalit on 18 February 2013, successfully defeated them, possibly 
because the French and their allies adopted some of the principles of warfare that had made 
Islamists and rebels so successful in the region. Operation Panthère relied on a combination of 
airstrikes, artillery and ground combat operations conducted by the French, knowledge of the 
country provided by Tuareg guides, and Chadian desert warfare. Chadian troops and their highly 
mobile light trucks proved as effective in Mali as they have in the past 30 years in their own 
country. 
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Figure 7: Events connected chronologically, 2004-2014 
 
Note: the color of the lines refers to the year(s). 
 
As in 2012, most events in 2013 took place in Mali and Algeria, along a south-west–north-east 
axis extending from Bamako in Mali to Tamanrasset in Algeria. While the French and their allies 
pushed north, the rebels of the MNLA seized Kidal and Tin Zaouaten from Islamist groups, and 
clashed with AQIM and MUJAO. The Algerian army also clashed with Islamist groups fleeing 
Mali towards Libya. The most brazen terrorist attack was launched in January 2013 against the 
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gas facility of In Amenas in Algeria where MUJAO and Al Moulathamoun coordinated their 
activities, resulting in at least 67 deaths. A decade after being expelled from Algeria, Al Qaeda-
affiliated groups were back in the country. Later that year, a camp of Niger’s military was hit by 
MUJAO in Agades in May, military barracks were attacked in Niamey in June by Those Who 
Sign in Blood, and two French journalists were killed by AQIM in Bamako in November 2013. 
 
The spatial patterns of attacks in 2014 are similar: principally concentrated in Northern Mali and, 
to a lesser extent, in Southern Algeria, localized events resulted from the French offensive in the 
Tighaghar Mountains that killed many Islamist leaders, and from MNLA rebels clashing with 
MUJAO. Roadside bombs and suicide car bombings organized by Al Mourabitoune targeted the 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The 
French-led anti-terrorist Opération Barkhane replaced Opération Serval in August 2014, and 
relies on highly mobile forces. Contrary to previous military engagements that targeted “one 
country, one crisis, and one theatre of operations”, Opération Barkhane explicitly addresses the 
regional and cross-border dimension of terrorist activity throughout the region. The Operation 
relies on three ports in the Gulf of Guinea, two main airports in the Sahel, and a series of Saharan 
outposts located at the extreme periphery of Chad, Mali and Niger to disrupt cross-border 
trafficking routes and terrorist networks. Considering that Algeria and Libya are beyond the 
reach of any foreign armed forces and that the French military is stretched to the limit (de 
Galbert 2015), for the time being Opération Barkhane is the most ambitious military initiative at 
the regional level. 
 
5.2. State border strategies 
 
Do borders not matter if they cannot offer sanctuary? On the contrary, our analysis suggests that 
borders do matter because countries have put in place management strategies that affect the 
spatial patterns of Islamist groups. Building on Arsenault and Bacon’s (2015) distinction 
between government will and capability to fight foreign terrorist groups, four situations can be 
distinguished (Table 4). States may have the military capacity to challenge transnational groups 
and choose to do so. In the region, Mauritania is probably the country most similar to this 
situation. Despite the small size of its armed forces, Mauritania took a number of strong military 
measures to control the flows of Islamist groups across its borders: develop mobile patrols, 
attack intruders systematically and establish partnerships with local tribes. As our analysis 
revealed, this firm attitude, combined with a national strategy for deradicalization (Ould Ahmed 
Salem 2013), has occasioned a significant decrease of violent events since 2012.  
 
Table 4: Government will and capacity to fight transnational groups 
  Will 
  Strong Weak 
Capacity Strong e.g. Mauritania Algeria 
Weak e.g. Niger e.g. Mali 
 
Some states may also be in a position to deny foreign fighters access to their territory but choose 
not to do so, for strategic reasons. Whether Algeria would have adopted this strategy is a matter 
of debate. On the one hand, having suffered from decades of political violence, Algeria is 
strongly committed to combating terrorism in the region and plays a major role in peace 
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negotiations in Mali. During the Malian conflict, Algeria deployed tens of thousands of troops to 
secure its borders, which are probably the most heavily guarded in the region. On the other hand, 
Islamist groups would have been unlikely to emerge in Northern Mali if Algeria’s borders had 
been hermetically sealed. Many of the aforementioned groups originally hail from Algeria or are 
affiliated with organizations based there, and there is strong evidence that Algerian borders are 
easily crossed by Islamist groups to get food and oil supplies through informal arrangements 
with state representatives (CSIS 2014).  
 
The third situation, where states may want to disrupt transnational groups without being able to 
project military power into borderlands, characterizes Niger. The 5,700 km border of Niger has 
long been poorly guarded due to lack of men and material. AQIM and other groups have 
capitalized on the situation either to take hostages in the region or to move to the south of Libya, 
where numerous Islamist groups have found favorable conditions (CSIS 2014). Finally, Mali 
exemplifies a lack of political will and ability to fight foreign Islamist groups. The gradual 
withdrawal of the state from the North of the country in the 2000s left Mali’s borders unguarded 
and frequented by traffickers and militant groups.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The article examines the structure and spatial patterns of VPOs in the Sahel-Sahara, a region 
characterized by growing political instability over the last 20 years. Based on a novel approach 
that combines signed and directed graphs, our methodological contribution has been to highlight 
opposed groups and distinguish among several kinds of aggressors depending on their conflict 
patterns. In settings where groups form shifting alliances and oppositions, an approach that takes 
into account not only the local, pairwise relationships, but also the global patterns that emerge, is 
needed for situational awareness. Conventional social network analysis can represent positive 
ties, but not ties where direction matters, or where ties represent a negative association. 
Furthermore, these are not independent properties of a social network and so must be represented 
together. This article has illustrated the effectiveness of extending social network analysis to 
such settings. Conventional social network measures fail in these settings. For example, 
measures such as betweenness are inappropriate because negativity does ‘flow’ in the way that 
positivity is conceived, and centrality is not a crucial property when negativity separates nodes 
far from the center. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the paper advances theory on the spatiality of Islamist groups by 
showing that sanctuary is immaterial to Saharan borders because many Islamist groups seek to 
control the movement of people and (often illicit) goods (Bøås 2015). The inability to garrison a 
sparsely populated region such as the Sahel-Sahara – which is the size of the United States – 
makes it difficult to hold territory. This situation is similar to the one adopted by Daesh between 
Syria and Iraq, and radically different from the territorial objective of such groups as Boko 
Haram in Africa, or the Taliban on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, for which the defense of a 
delineated territory is paramount. 
 
Building on publicly available data, we started by mapping how 179 organizations involved in 
political violence were structurally connected through conflict and alliances. Our results show 
that the network that connects actors in conflict has a low density, a low level of transitivity, and 
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contains few central actors, three typical features of negative-tie networks. AQIM is 
unequivocally the most connected organization, both in terms of the overall number of actors 
with which the group is in conflict, and the respective centrality of its enemies. In network terms, 
this is a liability. Divided into several clusters, the positive-tie network has a long path-length 
distance, low density and low clustering coefficient, a structure that suggests that most 
organizations tend to build limited alliances rather than broad coalitions across the region. 
 
We then combined the two networks and modeled the effect of having friends and foes 
simultaneously. Using the attack relationships, we also measured the level of outgoing and 
incoming aggression of each group. From this approach, five categories emerge. The first 
category includes neutral actors, represented in the middle of our graphs. The following 
categories include three kinds of groups that cluster together: victims, groups that are attacked 
more than they themselves attack, and groups that counter violence and thus attack more than 
they are attacked (e.g. militaries). The fifth category includes violent extremist groups that attack 
more than they are attacked, such as VPOs. Groups that are net attackers are indistinguishable at 
the level of individual behavior, but clearly separate into pro- and anti-violent extremism based 
on the groups to which they are close. This conclusion is in line with our original assumption that 
the propensity to use political violence concur with a group’s position in the social network.  
 
The second part of the article mapped a series of 389 events related to nine major Islamist groups 
in the region. Spatial analysis suggests that violent events involving Islamist groups have 
followed different patterns depending on the period under consideration but reveals no evidence 
of a border ‘sanctuary’. While violence was concentrated almost exclusively within Algeria until 
2004, cross-border movement has since intensified, following the establishment of military bases 
by AQIM in Mali. This suggests a ‘mobility’ scenario similar to the Arab revolt of the 20th 
century during which a highly mobile irregular force defeated the immobile and defensive 
Ottoman Turkish army. Our analysis suggests that until the French-led military offensive of 
2013, military operations of trans-Saharan Islamist groups were “more like naval warfare than 
ordinary land operations, in their mobility, their ubiquity, their independence of bases and 
communications, their lack of ground features, of fixed directions, of fixed points” (Lawrence 
1920). More recently, Islamist groups have concentrated their operations in Northern Mali as 
well as Southern Algeria, leaving Mauritania, Niger and Chad relatively unscathed. Owing to the 
Malian conflict and to a series of state and international military initiatives, cross-border 
movement has been on the wane in some countries, which seems to validate our original 
assumption that Islamist groups concentrate on border segments that are less heavily guarded 
and/or where informal arrangements with border officials are possible. 
 
Our results have policy implications for governments and external forces involved in deterring 
politically violent organizations. First, unlike their adversaries, VPOs are socially and spatially 
connected across the regions; so, there is a need for collective security institutions that can help 
countries coordinate, build trust, and go beyond ad hoc engagements. In recent years, several 
‘Sahel’ strategies have been initiated by organizations as diverse as the European Union (2011), 
the United Nations (2013), the Economic Community of West African States (2014), the African 
Union (2014), and the regional coordination framework G5 Sahel, to address governance, 
security and development in the region. Building institutional capacity around common interests 
is likely to pay off in a region that is largely devoid of collective security institutions. Precedent 
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also suggests that states outside the region will continue to play a supporting rather than a lead 
role. In addition to supporting capacity-building efforts already underway, Western governments 
should be prepared to mount a comprehensive Whole-of-Government effort in support of local 
authorities that will minimize their local footprint while optimizing outcomes. From a military 
perspective, the fluidity of personal allegiances and mobility of actors across borders in the 
region calls for a mobile and flexible military response. Regional volatility notwithstanding, 
operations Serval and Barkhane suggest that desert insurgents are not impervious to external 
attack. As Western armies and their African allies become more mobile and flexible in their 
regional responses to political violence, desert insurgency proves to be a double-edged sword 
that can also work against those who know the terrain best. 
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Appendix 1. Violent political organizations, 1997-2014 
 
Abu Obeida Brigade 
Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade 
Al Qaeda 
Al Qaqa Brigade 
Al-Burayqah Martyr’s Brigade 
Al-Salafiya 
Al Jihadia 
Ansar al-Sharia 
Ansar Dine 
Ansaru 
AQIM: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
Boko Haram 
Brega Martyrs Brigade 
El-Farouk Brigade 
Falcons for the Liberation of Africa 
February 17 Martyrs Brigade 
Fighters of The Martyrs Brigade 
FIS: Islamic Salvation Front 
GIA: Armed Islamic Group 
GMA: Mourabitounes Group of Azawad 
GSL: Free Salafist Group 
GSPC: Salafist Group for Call and Combat 
Islamic Emirate of Barqa 
Islamic State of Tripoli 
Knights of Change 
Libya Shield Brigade 
LIDD: The Islamic League for Preaching and Holy Struggle 
Martyrs’ Brigade 
MUJAO: Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 
Muslim Brotherhood 
Nawasi Brigade 
Nusur al-Sahel Brigade 
Rafallah Sehati Brigade 
Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria 
Those Who Signed in Blood 
Timizart Brigade 
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Appendix 2. Aggression levels for all groups that have more than one enemy 
 
Group aggression outaggression inaggression 
Rioters (Libya) 1.32 1.32 0.00 
Military Forces of Libya 0.43 0.50 0.07 
MUJAO 0.32 0.84 0.53 
Military Forces of Algeria 0.28 0.50 0.21 
Protesters (Mali) 0.21 0.21 0.00 
Protesters (Libya) 0.19 0.19 0.00 
GIA 0.14 0.31 0.17 
Military Forces of Tunisia 0.14 0.14 0.00 
Police Forces of Tunisia 0.13 0.13 0.00 
Unidentified Armed Group (Algeria) 0.11 0.11 0.00 
Civilians (France) 0.11 0.26 0.15 
GMA 0.10 0.16 0.06 
Libya Shield Brigade 0.09 0.54 0.45 
Military Forces of Chad 0.09 0.12 0.04 
Military Forces of Libya Special Forces 0.06 0.13 0.06 
Libyan Rebel Forces 0.06 0.27 0.20 
LIDD 0.06 0.09 0.03 
GSPC 0.05 0.31 0.26 
AQIM 0.05 0.76 0.71 
Military Forces of Nigeria 0.04 0.09 0.05 
Wershefana Communal Militia (Libya) 0.03 0.14 0.10 
GLD 0.01 0.04 0.04 
Boko Haram 0.01 0.19 0.18 
Ansar Dine 0.00 0.42 0.42 
El-Farouk Brigade 0.00 0.06 0.06 
Military Forces of Mali 0.00 0.22 0.22 
MNLA 0.00 0.23 0.23 
Military Forces of France 0.00 0.25 0.25 
Those Who Signed in Blood -0.01 0.09 0.09 
Martyrs Brigade -0.02 0.04 0.06 
February 17 Martyrs Brigade -0.02 0.16 0.18 
Patriot Militia of Algerian Government -0.03 0.12 0.15 
Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade -0.04 0.00 0.04 
Civilians (Nigeria) -0.04 0.05 0.09 
Military Forces of Mauritania -0.05 0.05 0.10 
Military Forces of Niger -0.07 0.10 0.17 
Al Qaqa Brigade -0.07 0.00 0.07 
Ansaru -0.08 0.04 0.12 
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Police Forces of Algeria -0.08 0.13 0.21 
FIS -0.08 0.00 0.08 
Al Qaeda -0.10 0.21 0.31 
Unidentified Armed Group (Libya) -0.10 0.37 0.48 
Civilians (Libya) -0.12 0.09 0.21 
Police Forces of Morocco -0.12 0.00 0.12 
Civilians (Niger) -0.12 0.00 0.12 
Civilians (Algeria) -0.12 0.08 0.21 
Rafallah Sehati Brigade -0.13 0.00 0.13 
UN -0.14 0.07 0.21 
Zawia Ethnic Militia (Libya) -0.16 0.00 0.16 
Civilians (Morocco) -0.16 0.00 0.16 
Civilians (International) -0.20 0.04 0.24 
Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria -0.21 0.00 0.21 
Civilians (Mali) -0.36 0.00 0.36 
Ansar al-Sharia -0.52 0.53 1.05 
Muslim Brotherhood -0.91 0.00 0.91 
Note: For each group, the outaggression is the average length of outgoing attack ties in the 
embedded graph, inaggression is the average length of incoming attack ties, and net aggression is 
the difference of the two. 
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Appendix 3. Aggression levels for Libyan organizations 
 
Group aggression outaggression inaggression 
Protesters 1.24 1.24 0.00 
Military Forces 0.77 0.83 0.07 
Libyan Rebel Forces 0.41 0.68 0.28 
Libya Shield Brigade 0.36 1.13 0.77 
Wershefana Communal Militia 0.20 0.51 0.31 
Misratah Communal Militia 0.00 0.32 0.32 
Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade 0.00 0.06 0.06 
Ansar al-Sharia -0.04 0.70 0.74 
Islamist Militia -0.06 0.00 0.06 
Brega Martyrs Brigade -0.06 0.00 0.06 
Vigilante Militia -0.07 0.00 0.07 
Al Qaeda -0.09 0.00 0.09 
Al Qaqa Brigade -0.11 0.85 0.96 
Zintan Ethnic Militia -0.22 0.00 0.22 
Operation Libya Dawn -0.23 0.00 0.23 
Zawia Ethnic Militia -0.25 0.00 0.25 
Civilians -0.26 0.22 0.48 
Gharyan Communal Militia -0.30 0.00 0.30 
February 17 Martyrs Brigade -0.47 0.06 0.53 
Rafallah Sehati Brigade -0.81 0.00 0.81 
Source: ACLED. Calculations: authors. Note: the following organizations with entirely zero 
rows have been removed from the table: El-Farouk Brigade, Al-Sawaiq Battalion, BSRC, 
Journalists, Police Forces, Salafist Group, Mutiny of Military Forces, Janzur Communal Militia, 
Awlad Suleiman Ethnic Militia, Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries.  
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Appendix 4. Aggression levels for Nigerian organizations 
 
Group aggression outaggression inaggression 
Boko Haram 1.08 3.51 2.43 
Martyrs Brigade 0.98 0.98 0.00 
Ansaru 0.72 1.09 0.36 
Shuwa Ethnic Militia 0.48 0.48 0.00 
Lassa Communal Militia 0.47 0.47 0.00 
Kawuri Communal Militia 0.42 0.42 0.00 
Military Forces 0.36 0.41 0.04 
Attagara Communal Militia 0.32 0.32 0.00 
Civilian Joint Task Force 0.04 0.04 0.00 
Borno Vigilance Youths Group 0.04 0.04 0.00 
Unidentified Armed Group 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Civilians (Lebanon) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Police Forces 0.00 0.04 0.04 
Vigilante Militia 0.00 0.04 0.04 
Militia (Ali Kwara) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fulani Ethnic Group 0.00 0.00 0.00 
All Progressives Congress 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VGN: Vigilante Group 0.00 0.48 0.48 
Shiite Muslim Group 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Civilians (China) -0.03 0.00 0.03 
UN -0.04 0.00 0.04 
Christian Militia -0.31 0.00 0.31 
Civilians (International) -0.57 0.00 0.57 
Military Forces Joint Task Force -0.64 0.00 0.64 
Civilians (South Korea) -0.70 0.00 0.70 
Private Security Forces -0.78 0.00 0.78 
Civilians (Europe) -0.89 0.00 0.89 
Civilians -0.98 0.04 1.02 
Source: ACLED. Calculations: authors. Note: the following organizations with entirely zero 
rows have been removed from the table: ANPP, Prison Guards, Muslim Group, Christian Group, 
Students, PDP, Government, Military Forces UK, Igbo Ethnic Group. 
